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Abstract 
In this paper, we empirically investigate the effect of entrepreneurship on economic growth at 
the country level. We use data from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, which provides 
comparative data on entrepreneurship from a wide range of countries. An important element of 
this paper is that we compare the effects of entrepreneurial activity on economic growth in high 
income, transition and low income countries. This dataset also enables us to make a distinction 
between the effects of entrepreneurship in general and growth-oriented entrepreneurship in 
particular. We present empirical tests of the impact of entrepreneurial activity on GDP growth 
over a four year period for a sample of 36 countries. Our empirical analyses suggest that 
entrepreneurship does not have an effect on economic growth in low income countries, in 
contrast to transition and high income countries where especially growth-oriented 
entrepreneurship seems to contribute strongly to macroeconomic growth. 
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1 Introduction 
Entrepreneurship has long been considered a crucial mechanism of economic development 
(Schumpeter 1934; Landes 1998). However, empirical studies on the role of entrepreneurship in 
economic growth show mixed evidence (Stam 2008). This is not remarkable because there is 
much heterogeneity in both the kinds of entrepreneurship and the kinds of economic contexts in 
which economic growth takes place. Until now studies have not sufficiently accounted for this 
heterogeneity on the micro and macro level, which limits our insight into the contingent role of 
entrepreneurship in economic growth. Important questions in this respect are: ‘How does the role 
of entrepreneurship differ between high income, transition, and low income countries?’, and 
‘What kinds of entrepreneurship are most crucial for economic growth?’. The objective of this 
paper is to provide insights into the role of different types of entrepreneurship in economic 
growth, and how this differs in poor and rich economies. 
 
We empirically investigate the effect of entrepreneurship on economic growth at the country 
level. We use data from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), which provides 
comparative data on entrepreneurship from a wide range of countries. An important element of 
this paper is that we compare the effects of entrepreneurial activity on economic growth in high 
income, transition (China, Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Slovenia) and low income countries 
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, India, Mexico, South Africa, and Thailand). This dataset also enables 
us to make a distinction between the effects of entrepreneurship in general and growth-oriented 
entrepreneurship in particular. We present empirical tests of the impact of entrepreneurial 
activity on GDP growth over a four year period for a sample of 36 countries.  
 
Our empirical analyses suggest that entrepreneurship does not have an effect on economic 
growth in low income countries, in contrast to transition and high income countries where 
especially growth-oriented entrepreneurship seems to contribute strongly to macroeconomic 
growth. In the final section of the paper we summarize our empirical findings and discuss the 
potential implications for development policies.  
2 Entrepreneurship and economic development 
Development is a broad concept entailing the raising of human capabilities (Sen 1999). One of 
the central challenges in improving economic development is to increase the standards of living 
for individuals and growth of the economy as a whole. Even though economic growth in itself is 
a rather narrow target, it is probably one of the most important targets for development policies. 
It is also one of the measures that is most easy to access for analysts, and probably the best 
measure to make cross-national (Barro 1991; Sala-i-Martin 1997) and historical (Maddison 
2001) analyses of the development of economies. Traditionally the economic output of a country 
is seen as a function of capital and labour inputs, combined with technical change (Solow 1957). 
Of course, conflicts and wars might interrupt this function (Sala-i-Martin 1997), but these are 
‘just’ contingencies. The standard production function used, shows that economic output (Y) is a 
function of the sum of labour and capital inputs, and the level of technological knowledge (i.e. 
productivity). This means that economic growth—the growth of economic output—is a function 
of the growth of labour and capital inputs and technological progress. In traditional models of 
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economic growth investment in capital, labour and technology is sufficient to realize economic 
growth. New models of economic growth see these investments as a necessary complement to 
entrepreneurship/innovation, but not as a sufficient explanation for economic growth in its own 
right (Nelson and Pack 1999). One could even argue that high rates of investment in human and 
physical capital are themselves stimulated by effective innovation, and cannot be maintained in 
the absence of innovation. Recent studies emphasize entrepreneurship as a driver of economic 
development and some authors include entrepreneurship as a fourth production factor in the 
macroeconomic production function (Audretsch and Keilbach 2004). Entrepreneurship is the 
factor that creates wealth by combining existing production factors in new ways. Entrepreneurs 
experiment with new combinations of which the outcomes are uncertain, but in order to make 
progress, many new variations have to be tried in order to find out which ones will improve 
(economic) life (Rosenberg and Birdzell 1986). Other authors have argued that entrepreneurship 
will only unlock economic development if a proper institutional setting is in place (Baumol 
1990; Powell 2008; Boettke and Coyne 2003). This institutional setting comprises informal as 
well as formal institutions (North 1990). An essential formal institution for welfare enhancing 
entrepreneurship is property rights. Insecure property rights have been an important constraint on 
the investments by entrepreneurs in transition countries, even more so than capital market 
constraints (Johnson et al. 2000). A specific example regarding property rights is the fact that 
until 1988 private firms with more than seven workers were not even allowed to operate legally 
in China (Dorn 2008: 301). It might be said that the production factors capital, labour, 
technology, and entrepreneurship are the proximate causes of economic development, while 
institutions are a fundamental cause of economic development (Acemoglu et al. 2004).  
Next to productivity growth and technological change in established sectors, the development 
process in less advanced countries is largely about structural change (Nelson and Pack 1999; 
Rodrik 2007; Gries and Naudé 2008). A process in which an economy finds out—self-
discovers—what it can be good at, out of the many products that already exist. The role of 
entrepreneurs in developing countries does not equal innovation and R&D commonly understood 
in advanced economies. Their role is to discover that a certain good, already well-established in 
world markets, can be produced at home at low cost (Rodrik 2007: 105; Hausmann and Rodrik 
2003).1 Examples of this are the entrepreneurs that figured out that Bangladesh was good in the 
production of T-shirts, Colombia in cut flowers, India in software services, and Taiwan in 
bicycles and display technologies. Even if entrepreneurs cannot appropriate all these gains for 
themselves, their discoveries generate large social gains for their economies. Spurring 
entrepreneurs to invest in their home economy is said to be one of the most important aspects of 
stimulating growth in poor countries (Rodrik 2007: 44–50). Investing refers here to innovation 
(e.g. employing new technology, producing new products, searching for new markets) and 
expanding capacity. These investments trigger the combination of capital investment and 
technological change.  
 
In advanced capitalist economies, innovation and structural change take place through the 
combined efforts of small (independent inventors) and large innovative (organized R&D) firms, 
which complement each other in changing the economy (Nooteboom 1994; Baumol 2002). In 
developing countries the large firms are missing, and in transition countries there are large 
                                                 
1
 In fragile and failed states, entrepreneurship has another role in building up the private sector. From another 
starting point, the same counts for formerly communist countries.  
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organizations but these are largely in a process of restructuring and dismantling. This means that 
small firms will be the prime movers in the process of structural change in developing and 
transition economies.  
 
We expect that the level of growth-oriented entrepreneurship in a country is a more relevant 
driver of economic growth than the mostly used indicators of entrepreneurship like the self-
employment and new firm formation. In contrast to rich countries, entrepreneurship in low 
income countries is mainly driven by necessity (Bosma et al. 2008).2 Most entrepreneurs in these 
economies do not start a firm because they desire independence or because they want to increase 
their income as compared to being an employee, which are the dominant motives in rich 
countries. Most new businesses in low income countries are started out of necessity, in contrast 
to high income countries, where entrepreneurship is most often opportunity driven. This is 
reflected in the finding that in poor countries self-employed are less happy than employees, 
while the reverse is true in high income countries (Blanchflower and Oswald 1998; Graham 
2005). Entrepreneurs in low income countries most often start a business because they have no 
other way of earning a living. These entrepreneurs are not likely to be involved in a process of 
self-discovery; their actions are not likely to have an effect on the restructuring and 
diversification of the poor economies (Rodrik 2007).  
3 Data and research method 
It is generally acknowledged that there are differences in the distribution of entrepreneurship 
across countries. Studies exploring differences in entrepreneurship across countries often focus 
on the incidence of new firm registration or self-employment, which may not be reliable 
indicators when applied to transition and developing countries with significant informal 
economies and fewer alternatives to self-employment. For these reasons we have used the Young 
Business (YB) indicator, defined as the percentage of adult population that is the owner/manager 
of a business that is less than 42 months old (a young business). Many studies have used the total 
entrepreneurial activity (TEA) index, but that also includes the more speculative category of 
nascent entrepreneurs (individuals preparing a new business). In the current study we investigate 
whether the presence of growth-oriented entrepreneurs is a more important determinant of 
national economic growth than entrepreneurial activity in general. In the current paper we will 
perform regression analyses with next to the general YB index, the YB high growth expectation 
rate and the YB medium growth expectation rate as independent variables and compare their 
impact on economic growth with the impact of the general YB index. The data and model used 
in this study are described below. 
 
We use a sample of 36 countries participating in the GEM in 2002. Data on six basic variables 
are used in our model: YB rate, YB medium growth, YB high growth, growth of GDP, per capita 
income, and the growth competitiveness index (GCI). The sources and definitions of these 
variables are listed below.  
                                                 
2
 The only exceptions are Chile and Uruguay. 
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3.1 YB index 
YB is defined as the percentage of adult population that is the owner/manager of a business that 
is less than 42 months old. The YB high (medium) growth expectation rate is defined as the 
percentage of adult population that is the owner/manager of a business that is less than 42 
months old, and expects to employ 20 (6) employees or more within five years (YB6 and YB20). 
The YB medium growth rate reveals some similarity with the entrepreneurship indicator by 
Djankov et al. (2006), which includes owner-managers of a business with five or more 
employees. Data on the YB rate are taken from the GEM Adult Population Survey for 2002. 
3.2 Growth of GDP (∆GDP) 
(Real) GDP growth rates are taken from the IMF World Economic Outlook database of the 
International Monetary Fund from September 2005. In equations (1) and (2) below variable 
∆GDPit refers to period 2002–05 (average annual growth) while the lagged GDP growth variable 
(∆GDPi,t-1) refers to period 1998–2001. 
3.3 Per capita income (GNIC) 
Most studies on GDP growth include the initial level of income in their analysis and find it to be 
significant (the conditional convergence effect; cf. Abramovitz 1986). Gross national income per 
capita 2001 is expressed in (thousands of) purchasing power parities per US$, and these data are 
taken from the 2002 World Development Indicators database of the World Bank. 
3.4 Growth Competitiveness Index (GCI) 
In order to cover some aspects of the state of technology and institutions in a country (see section 
2) we used the Growth Competitiveness Index for the year 2001 of the World Economic Forum 
(see McArthur and Sachs 2002). Given the low number of observations we are forced to use a 
combined index in our model. Even though there are huge problems in measuring technological 
capabilities and institutions (see Lall 2001), the composite GCI is probably the best combined 
index available that covers these two factors simultaneously.  
 
We investigate whether (growth-oriented) entrepreneurship may be considered a determinant of 
economic growth, alongside the well-known determinants technology, public institutions, and 
the macroeconomic environment, which are captured by the GCI. As both entrepreneurship and 
the factors underlying the GCI are assumed to be structural characteristics of an economy, we do 
not want to explain short term economic growth but rather growth in the medium term. Therefore 
we choose average annual growth over a period of four years (2002–05) as the dependent 
variable in this study. Following Van Stel et al. (2005) we use (the log of) initial income level of 
countries, to correct for catch-up effects, and lagged growth of GDP, to correct for reversed 
causality effects, as additional control variables.3 
                                                 
3
 When the growth expectations for the national economy are good, more entrepreneurs may expect to grow their 
business in the years to come. Hence, there may also be a (reversed) effect of economic growth on (high 
expectation) entrepreneurship. To limit the potential impact of reversed causality we include lagged GDP growth 
as an additional explanatory variable. As this variable may influence both (high expectation) entrepreneurship 
and current GDP growth, omission might have led to a bias in the estimated effect of entrepreneurship on 
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We allow for the possibility of different effects for high income, transition, and low income 
countries. In addition we also test whether the effect of YB is different for transition countries.4 
YB rates may reflect different types of entrepreneurs in countries with different development 
levels, implying different impacts on growth. This is tested by defining separate YB variables for 
different groups of countries (high income, transition, and low income countries). Our model is 
represented by equations (1) and (2). These equations are estimated separately by OLS. The 
expectation that growth-oriented young businesses contribute more to national economic growth 
than young businesses in general corresponds to b2 (c2) being larger than b1 (c1). In these 
equations subscripts t and t-1 loosely indicate that the independent variables are measured prior 
to the dependent variable. The exact years and periods for which the variables are measured can 
be found in the variable description above. 
 
∆GDPit = a + b1 YBrichi,t-1 + c1 YBtransitioni,t-1 + d1 YBpoori,t-1 + e 
log(GNICi,t-1) + f GCIi,t-1 + g ∆GDPi,t-1 + εit      
  (1) 
∆GDPit = a + b2 YB_high growth richi,t-1 + c2 YB_high growth transitioni,t-1 + 
d2 YB_high growth poori,t-1 + e log(GNICi,t-1) + f GCIi,t-1 + g ∆GDPi,t-1 + εit  
  (2) 
To illustrate the data at hand, Table 1 provides the YB rates and the YB medium and high 
growth rates in 2002 as well as the average annual growth rates of GDP over the period 2002–05.  
From Table 1 and Figures 1 and 2 it can be seen that the ranking of countries in terms of YB or 
YB high growth may be quite different. For instance, while China ranks fifth in terms of YB, it 
ranks first in terms of high growth YB. In contrast, Thailand ranks third in terms of YB, but only 
tenth in terms of high growth YB.  
 
When we regress the rate of GDP growth on the YB rate and the YB20 rate, the YB20 rate 
reveals to have a stronger correlation with GDP growth (see Figures 3 and 4). In Section 4 we 
will investigate more thoroughly whether YB and high growth YB affect national economic 
growth differently. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
economic growth. We also measure YB rates in a year (2002) preceding the period over which the dependent 
variable is measured (2002-05). By including lagged independent variables as well as a lagged dependent 
variable on the right-hand side, we basically measure the effects in a Granger-causality type of framework 
(Granger 1969). Still, the possibility of reversed effects cannot be ruled out completely. 
4
 The 36 countries in our sample are divided into three categories: rich, poor, and transition. The 24 rich countries 
are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, the UK, 
and the USA. Our seven poor nations are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, India, Mexico, South Africa, and Thailand. 
The five transition countries are China, Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Slovenia. With the exception of Hungary 
and Slovenia, the transitional countries can be classified as (relatively) poor as well. 
10 
4 Entrepreneurship and national economic growth 
4.1 Regression analyses 
The results of our empirical exercises are in Table 2. Model I presents the regression results of 
the impact of the general YB index (see equation 1), while Models II and III show the results 
using the YB6 and YB20 rates as main independent variables (see equation 2).  
 
The results presented in Table 2 show that the impact of entrepreneurial activity is significantly 
positive for rich countries, but effectively zero for poor countries.  
 
The presence of growth-oriented entrepreneurs seems to be more important for achieving GDP 
growth than general entrepreneurship. Comparing the coefficients of the various YB rates, we 
see that the impact of YB6 is greater when compared to the impact of YB in general. Meanwhile 
the impact of YB20 is even greater, but not always statistically significant.  
 
Having more growth-oriented entrepreneurs seems to be particularly important in transition 
countries. Both the magnitude and the statistical significance of the estimated coefficient point at 
a stronger impact compared to rich or poor countries. There are many reasons that could explain 
the importance of growth-oriented entrepreneurs in transition countries (Smallbone and Welter 
2006). First, there are many entrepreneurial opportunities in formerly state-dominated sectors. 
Second, many highly qualified individuals lost their jobs at state-financed organizations (e.g. 
universities, enterprises, government services). Third, there are many highly qualified (potential) 
entrepreneurs in these countries (especially in Eastern European countries), who do not face the 
opportunity costs of working for large public or private organizations. Fourth, those highly 
qualified (potential) entrepreneurs are also well connected to the power networks that were, and 
to a large extent still are important in the political and economic arena of these countries, which 
takes away some barriers for high growth firms in these countries. Summarizing, it may be 
argued that in transition economies high growth opportunities are more widely available and 
hence, a higher number of growth-oriented entrepreneurs are willing to act on these opportunities 
may be particularly fruitful for achieving growth in these countries. However, we should be 
aware of the large diversity in the group of transition countries, which comprises countries like 
Russia and China, as well as Hungary and Slovenia. We will take a closer look on a few low 
income and transition countries in the next sections.  
 
Our regression results should be interpreted with care as the analysis is based on a limited 
number of observations (36 countries). As a test of robustness we estimated the models leaving 
out one country at a time, i.e. we computed 36 auxiliary regressions, where each regression uses 
35 observations (each time leaving one of the 36 countries out). Although t-values sometimes 
dropped a little, coefficients and t-values were generally in line with those reported in Table 2. 
The country that matters the most for the results obtained in Table 2 is China. This is not 
surprising as China combines high YB/YB6/YB20 rates with high GDP growth rates (see Table 
1). When leaving this country out of the sample, the coefficient (t-value) for the transition 
countries is 0.32 (0.5) for the YB rate, 1.47 (1.2) for the YB6 rate, and 1.72 (1.1) for the YB20 
rate. The low t-values are in part due to the low number of observations. Note however that the 
coefficients are very similar to the full sample estimates reported in Table 2. Furthermore, the 
Jarque–Bera test on the normality of disturbances is passed for all models reported in Table 2, 
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indicating that it is not necessary to remove individual country observations. Therefore we feel 
that our results are quite robust to the potential influence of outliers. Nevertheless, given the low 
number of observations, the results should only be seen as a first illustration of how the impact of 
different types of entrepreneurship may differ between groups of countries with different levels 
of development. 
4.2 Low income countries  
Within the groups of transition and developing economies there are substantial differences in 
entrepreneurship rates. Chile stands out because of a particularly high rate of growth-oriented 
entrepreneurship, while Mexico has a particularly low rate of growth-oriented entrepreneurship. 
In contrast to rich countries, entrepreneurship in developing economies is mainly driven by 
necessity: self-employment is often the only occupational choice given a paucity of other sources 
of employment (necessity-based entrepreneurship; see: Acs and Amoros 2008; Bosma et al. 
2008). The actions of most of the entrepreneurs in low income countries are not likely to have an 
effect on the restructuring and diversification of the poor economies. This would be the whole 
story if the rates of growth-oriented entrepreneurship would also be marginal in these economies. 
This is only the case for Mexico. Next to Chile—where opportunity-driven entrepreneurship is 
dominant—Brazil, India, and Argentina perform quite well with respect to growth-oriented 
entrepreneurship. This means that there still is a substantial group of entrepreneurs in low 
income countries that might get involved in a process of self-discovery. The problem in practice 
is that in contrast to rich and transition economies, growth-oriented entrepreneurship is less 
likely to be realized in developing economies, due to constraints on the provision of capital and 
(skilled) labour.  
 
An additional constraint in low income countries is that there is generally a lack of (foreign) 
larger companies, which could act as a training ground for prospective growth-oriented 
entrepreneurs, and could open up distributions channels for new fledgling enterprises (Knorringa 
1996). One should make a distinction between productive (manufacturing) and resource 
extractive (mining, oil) activities here, as the former will be a more useful for the development of 
entrepreneurship than the latter.  
4.3 Transition countries 
New firms in transition countries not only displace obsolete incumbents but also fill in new 
markets, which were either non-existent or poorly populated in the past. Our study suggests that 
in transition countries, growth-oriented entrepreneurs make an important contribution to 
economic growth. They create new jobs with relatively high incomes which the small incumbent 
population of private firms cannot provide. This entrepreneurial growth process is facilitated by 
the relatively high levels of human capital in combination with relatively low opportunity costs 
of self-employment of the adult population. The high degree of environmental dynamism in 
these countries—which is likely to positively affect the level of growth expectations and 
realizations of entrepreneurs in these countries—requires ambitious and well-connected 
entrepreneurs in order to translate these abundant opportunities in economic growth.  
 
There are considerable differences within the group of transition countries. Hsu (2005) shows 
that the role of these connections differs considerably between China and Russia: in China it was 
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a tool which could be used to build enough trust to allow business transactions to succeed 
(‘capitalism without contracts’). In contrast, in Russia these connections devolved into 
corruption, and faded in importance for ordinary citizens. Without a way to build trust or extend 
networks, Russians retreated into defensive involution, and engaged in predatory behaviour 
against those outside their small circles of friends. Instead of capitalism without contracts, Russia 
suffered the depredations of ‘capitalists without capitalism’. 
 
There are also substantial differences in entrepreneurship rates within the groups of transition 
economies. China stands out because of particularly high rates of growth-oriented 
entrepreneurship (cf. Hsu 2005). Even though the YB rate is below the average of transition 
countries, the growth of self-employment has been enormous, not only in the richer coastal 
provinces, but also in rural areas (Mohapatra et al. 2007). Research by Djankov et al. (2006) also 
showed that entrepreneurs in China are more risk-taking and more committed to an 
entrepreneurial career than entrepreneurs in Russia. In addition, Russia has (and had: see Hsu 
2005) a particularly low rate of entrepreneurship in general as well. The striking difference 
between entrepreneurship rates in China and Russia can be explained by their different paths 
from socialism to capitalism: gradualism and a shock therapy (see Burawoy 1996).  
 
In China the gradual transformation started with a policy of decollectivization (decentralization 
of property relations) in the late 1970s and the promotion of smallscale industry, with a focus on 
promoting independent entrepreneurship. Experimentation with new economic arrangements, for 
example privatization of small state-owned enterprises, has led to a favourable accumulation of 
productive capabilities in China. In contrast, Russia underwent a shock therapy in which the old 
communist regime was liquidated, with a focus on rapid privatization of the state sector.  
 
However, the Russian state failed to organize a market economy, which led to a coordination and 
entrepreneurial vacuum into which have stepped conglomerates, banks and mafia, siphoning off 
surplus from production to exchange (Burawoy 1996).  
5 Discussion of policy implications 
In this section we will shortly discuss the potential implications of our exploration of the 
relationship between types of entrepreneurship and economic growth for entrepreneurship policy 
and industrial/cluster policy in low income and transition countries.5 
5.1 Entrepreneurship policy 
Our empirical analyses suggest that entrepreneurship does not have an effect on economic 
growth in low income countries, in contrast to transition and high income countries where both 
growth-oriented entrepreneurship and entrepreneurship in general seem to contribute strongly to 
macroeconomic growth. Does this mean that stimulating entrepreneurship in low income 
countries is bad policy? The least we can say is that stimulating entrepreneurship alone will be 
insufficient as it is likely to attract necessity entrepreneurs with low human capital levels who do 
not contribute to economic growth. The non-significant effect of entrepreneurship on economic 
                                                 
5
 For a review of public policies for high-growth start ups in high income countries see Stam et al. (2007).  
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growth in low income countries might point at a lack of large firms in these countries. By 
exploitation of economies of scale and scope and by adopting and diffusing technology 
developed elsewhere, large firms are important in transforming a developing economy into a 
developed economy (Van Stel et al. 2005). In these economies local workers are more productive 
working as a wage-employee compared to working as an (often marginal) entrepreneur. 
Nevertheless stimulating growth-oriented entrepreneurship might be an additional element of 
transforming a developing economy into a developed one. Attracting investments by large 
(possibly foreign) firms, stimulating growth-oriented entrepreneurship, investing in labour and 
capital and improving the institutional framework may be the recipe for growth here. On the one 
hand this is old news, in that it provides a plea for the traditional role of governments to invest in 
education and physical infrastructure, and to build and maintain a set of institutions that enable 
the development of the private sector (cf. Rosenberg and Birdzell 1986). On the other hand, the 
addition of growth-oriented entrepreneurship in development policy for low income and 
transition countries is a new element. One must be careful to target the right group of 
entrepreneurs though, i.e. governments should avoid that resources made available through 
government stimulation programmes are absorbed by necessity entrepreneurs with low human 
capital levels. 
5.2 Industrial/cluster policy 
The focus of this paper has been on the country level, which aggregates away the subnational 
level of analysis, and what is of particular relevance here, the level of regional clusters (regional 
concentrations of particular industries). These regional clusters have been proven to be important 
drivers of economic development in for example Taiwan, India, and Brazil. These clusters are 
both driven by and drive growth-oriented entrepreneurship. Growth-oriented entrepreneurs that 
start to invest in a particular industry are needed in order to reach a critical mass that is needed to 
reach certain agglomeration economies (Braunerhjelm and Feldman 2006). If the build-up of 
capacity to this level of critical mass is not reached due to the lack of complementary 
investments, there might be a role to play for governments to overcome coordination failure, for 
example by providing investment guarantees for entrepreneurs (see Rodrik 2007). Such 
industrial policy is not about ‘picking winners’ or comprehensive planning, but encouraging 
experiments with new types of economic activity (Rodrik 2007); since it is impossible to judge 
winners and losers in advance, competent and growth-oriented entrepreneurs should be 
encouraged to try, success rewarded and failure not coddled (Nelson and Pack 1999).  
These clusters do not have to be close to the technology frontier (as in advanced capitalist 
economies). The real policy implications arise from thinking carefully about the particular 
sources of advantage for a nascent cluster and why that source might yield short term 
complements with the potential to become long term substitutes (Bresnahan et al. 2001). 
Cooperation of clusters in developing countries with existing richer economies is not 
‘colonialist’. Take for example the linkages with the USA. India and Taiwan are linked to the 
USA (especially Silicon Valley) via outsourcing of software services and manufacturing (due to 
low labour costs), but also by a returning group of expatriates who have worked there, and who 
see the benefits of long distance collaboration (Saxenian 1999). There is a flow of people—the 
so-called Argonauts (Saxenian 2006)—and ideas back and forth between rich and emerging 
economies. Migrant workers tend to be among the most entrepreneurial in society. Governments 
of developing countries should not only look at these expatriate workers as a source of 
remittances. Given their entrepreneurialism, skills and exposure to business in the developed 
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world, as well as the desire of many of them to return home, they may be very important as a 
source of self-discovery in their country of origin (Rodrik 2007: 118–19). In addition to 
developing the private sector, these return migrants may provide the new elite needed for 
building up a civil society. Only a fraction of the money spent on attracting FDIs would be 
needed to target nationals abroad. This would attract more knowledgeable human capital and 
durable investments than most FDIs will do. Once critical mass is reached within a regional 
cluster, it is likely to generate or attract growth-oriented entrepreneurs (e.g. Argonauts), which 
on their turn stimulate further macroeconomic growth. 
5.3 Limitations and further research 
The regression analyses in this paper are of limited value: they have not only simplified the range 
and (linear) effects of determinants for economic development, they have also dumbed down 
economic development to economic growth over a short term (four- year) period. We know that 
sustaining growth is more difficult (and caused by different factors) than igniting it (Rodrik 
2007). This also connects to one of the other shortcomings: sustaining growth probably requires 
much more extensive institutional reform than can be properly taken into account in linear 
regression analyses. Next to better measures of institutions, future research should take into 
account samples with a larger number of low income and transition countries, and multiple years 
in order to achieve more robust empirical analyses. In addition, our data did not allow for testing 
the multiplicative effect of entrepreneurship, so we only analysed the additive effect. A larger 
number of cases would enable the inclusion of the more traditional indicators of capital and 
labour in the analyses, and allow for testing the multiplicative effect.  
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Table 1: YB rates (2002) and GDP growth rates for 36 countries 
 YB rate YB medium growth rate (6+) 
YB high growth 
rate (20+) 
Average GDP growth 
rate 2002–05 (%) 
United States 4.57 2.12 1.24 3.00 
Russia 1.54 1.23 1.05 6.18 
South Africa 2.00 0.88 0.58 3.60 
Netherlands 2.09 0.90 0.63 0.60 
Belgium 1.08 0.29 0.25 1.53 
France 0.86 0.29 0.22 1.43 
Spain 2.54 1.06 0.41 2.98 
Hungary 3.62 1.29 0.98 3.50 
Italy 2.35 1.14 0.84 0.48 
Switzerland 3.26 1.28 0.38 0.60 
United Kingdom 3.05 1.25 0.74 2.40 
Denmark 3.12 1.43 0.58 1.45 
Sweden 2.51 0.82 0.47 2.43 
Norway 4.40 1.29 0.75 1.88 
Poland 0.77 0.49 0.49 3.40 
Germany 2.07 1.12 0.83 0.58 
Mexico 3.22 0.81 0.32 2.40 
Argentina 6.20 1.70 1.46 3.60 
Brazil 8.46 3.17 2.34 2.65 
Chile 5.49 3.83 2.23 4.48 
Australia 5.22 2.10 1.25 3.18 
New Zealand 6.06 2.50 1.50 3.85 
Singapore 2.03 1.23 0.53 4.23 
Thailand 8.40 2.52 1.37 5.45 
Japan 1.04 0.52 0.26 1.45 
Korea 9.29 3.95 2.43 4.63 
China 7.41 2.83 2.57 9.08 
India 7.45 2.68 2.15 6.63 
Canada 3.58 1.51 0.91 2.73 
Ireland 4.20 1.90 0.92 5.00 
Iceland 6.23 2.79 1.98 3.28 
Finland 2.06 0.71 0.43 2.50 
Slovenia 1.53 0.71 0.41 3.58 
Hong Kong 1.40 0.56 0.14 4.88 
Taiwan 3.08 1.72 1.15 4.08 
Israel 3.88 2.81 1.94 2.28 
Mean 3.78 1.60 1.02 3.22 
Sources: GEM and IMF. 
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Table 2: Regression models average annual growth of GDP over the period 2002–05 (N=36) 
 Dependent variable: average annual growth of GDP over the period 2002–05 
 
 Model I: YB 
 
Model II: YB6 Model III: YB20 
Constant  
 
21.3 *** 
(2.8) 
 
19.5 *** 
(3.7) 
18.9 ** 
(2.7) 
Entrepreneurship in rich 
countries†  
 
0.20 ** 
(2.6) 
 
0.46 ** 
(2.4) 
0.48 
(1.3) 
Entrepreneurship in 
transition countries 
0.36 ** 
(2.1) 
 
1.24 *** 
(3.2) 
1.29 ** 
(2.5) 
Entrepreneurship in poor 
countries 
0.053 
(0.3) 
 
0.24 
(0.8) 
0.29 
(0.5) 
Log (GNIC) 
 
-2.3 ** 
(2.5) 
 
-2.2 *** 
(2.9) 
-2.2 ** 
(2.4) 
GCI 
 
0.59 
(0.7) 
 
0.80 
(1.1) 
0.86 
(1.1) 
Lagged GDP growth 0.22 
(1.1) 
 
0.18 
(0.9) 
0.21 
(1.0) 
 
R2 
 
0.672 
 
0.693 
 
0.676 
 
Jarque Bera statistic [p-
value] 
 
[0.259] 
 
[0.278] 
 
[0.427] 
Notes:  Absolute heteroskedasticity consistent t-values are between brackets.  
* Significant at a 0.10 level; ** 0.05 level; *** 0.01 level. 
†
 interaction rich country dummy with either YB, YB6, or YB20. 
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Figure 1: Levels of YB rate 
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Figure 3: Correlation YB rates and GDP growth rates 
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Figure 4: Correlation high growth-oriented YB rates (20+) and GDP growth rates 
R2 = 0,2884
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
0 1 2 3
YB20+
G
DP
 
gr
o
w
th
 
 
The UNU-MERIT WORKING Paper Series 
21 
 
2009-01 Effectiveness of R&D Tax Incentives in Small and Large Enterprises in Québec by 
Rufin Baghana and Pierre Mohnen 
2009-02 Bridges in social capital: A review of the definitions and the social capital of social 
capital researchers by Semih Akçomak 
2009-03 The Role of Firms in Energy Transformation by Radhika Perrot 
2009-04 Standards as a platform for innovation and learning in the global economy: a case 
study of Chilean salmon farming industry 
2009-05 Consumer behaviour: evolution of preferences and the search for novelty by M. 
Abraham Garcia-Torres 
2009-06 The role of consumption and the financing of health investment under epidemic shocks 
by Théophile T. Azomahou, Bity Diene and Luc Soete 
2009-07 Remittances, lagged dependent variables and migration stocks as determinants of 
migration from developing countries by Thomas H.W. Ziesemer 
2009-08 Thinking locally: Exploring the importance of a subsidiary-centered model of FDI-
related spillovers in Brazil by Anabel Marin and Ionara Costa 
2009-09 Are International Market Demands Compatible with Serving Domestic Social Needs? 
Challenges in Strengthening Innovation Capacity in Kenya’s Horticulture Industry by 
Mirjam Steglich, Ekin Keskin, Andy Hall and Jeroen Dijkman 
2009-10 Industrialisation as an engine of growth in developing countries by Adam Szirmai 
2009-11 The motivations, organisation and outcomes of university-industry interaction in the 
Netherlands by Isabel Maria Bodas Freitas and Bart Verspagen 
2009-12 Habit Formation, Demand and Growth through product innovation by M. Abraham 
Garcia-Torres 
2009-13 The Diffusion of Informal Knowledge and Innovation Performance: A sectoral approach 
by M. Abraham Garcia-Torres and Hugo Hollanders 
2009-14 What does it take for an R&D tax incentive policy to be effective? by Pierre Mohnen 
and Boris Lokshin 
2009-15 Knowledge Base Determinants of Technology Sourcing in the Clean Development 
Mechanism Projects by Asel Doranova, Ionara Costa and Geert Duysters  
2009-16 Stochastic environmental effects, demographic variation, and economic growth by 
Théophile T. Azomahou and Tapas Mishra 
2009-17 Measuring eco-innovation by Anthony Arundel and René Kemp 
2009-18 Learning How to Consume and Returns to Product Promotion by Zakaria Babutsidze 
2009-19 Strengthening Agricultural Innovation Capacity: Are Innovation Brokers the Answer? by 
Laurens Klerkx, Andy Hall and Cees Leeuwis 
2009-20 Collinearity in growth regressions: The example of worker remittances by Thomas H.W. 
Ziesemer 
2009-21 Foreign Direct Investment in Times of Global Economic Crisis by Sergey Filippov and 
Kálmán Kalotay 
2009-22 Network-independent partner selection and the evolution of innovation networks by 
Joel Baum, Robin Cowan and Nicolas Jonard 
2009-23 Multinational enterprises, development and globalisation: Some clarifications and a 
research agenda by Rajneesh Narula and John H. Dunning 
2009-24 Why Rural Rich Remain Energy Poor by Bilal Mirza and René Kemp 
2009-25 Compliance with the private standards and capacity building of national institutions 
under globalization: new agendas for developing countries? by Michiko Iizuka and Yari 
Borbon-Galvez 
2009-26 The Impact of the Credit Crisis on Poor Developing Countries: Growth, worker 
remittances, accumulation and migration by Thomas H.W. Ziesemer 
22 
2009-27 Designing plans for organizational development, lessons from three large-scale SME-
initiatives by Tinne Lommelen, Friso den Hertog, Lien Beck and Raf Sluismans 
2009-28 Growth with imported resources: On the sustainability of U.S. growth and foreign debt 
by Thomas H.W. Ziesemer 
2009-29 Innovative Sales, R&D and Total Innovation Expenditures: Panel Evidence on their 
Dynamics by Wladimir Raymond, Pierre Mohnen, Franz Palm and Sybrand Schim van 
der Loeff 
2009-30 Malthus’ Revenge by Luc Soete 
2009-31 Preparing for the Next, Very Long Crisis: Towards a ‘Cool’ Science and Technology 
Policy Agenda For a Globally Warming Economy by Paul A. David 
2009-32 Innovation and Economic Development by Jan Fagerberg, Martin Srholec and Bart 
Verspagen 
2009-33 Attracting and embedding R&D by multinational firms: policy recommendations for EU 
new member states by Rajneesh Narula 
2009-34 Student Network Centrality and Academic Performance: Evidence from United Nations 
University by Ying Zhang, Iman Rajabzadeh and Rodolfo Lauterbach 
2009-35 Reverse knowledge transfer and its implications for European policy by Rajneesh 
Narula and Julie Michel 
2009-36 Innovation for the base of the pyramid: Critical perspectives from development studies 
on heterogeneity and participation by Saurabh Arora and Henny Romijn 
2009-37 Caste as Community? Networks of social affinity in a South Indian village by Saurabh 
Arora and Bulat Sanditov 
2009-38 How productive are academic researchers in agriculture-related sciences? The 
Mexican case by René Rivera, José Luis Sampedro, Gabriela Dutrénit, Javier Mario 
Ekboir and Alexandre O. Vera-Cruz 
2009-39 Alliance-based Network View on Chinese Firms’ Catching-up: Case Study of Huawei 
Technologies Co.Ltd. by Ying Zhang 
2009-40 Innovation dynamics in Tuberculosis control in India: The shift to new partnerships by 
Nora Engel 
2009-41 Internationalization of Chinese firms in Europe by Ying Zhang and Sergey Filippov 
2009-42 Fits and Misfits: Technological Matching and R&D Networks by Robin Cowan, Nicolas 
Jonard and Bulat Sanditov 
2009-43 Explaining the lack of dynamics in the diffusion of small stationary fuel cells by Bert 
Droste-Franke, Jörg Krüger, Stephan Lingner and Thomas H.W. Ziesemer 
2009-44 FDI, R&D and Innovation Output in the Chinese Automobile Industry by Chen Fang and 
Pierre Mohnen 
2009-45 Inertia, Interaction and Clustering in Demand by Zakaria Babutsidze and Robin Cowan 
2009-46 What Do Complex Adaptive Systems Look Like and What Are the Implications for 
Innovation Policy? by Andy Hall and Norman Clark 
2009-47 Environmental innovation: Using qualitative models to identify indicators for policy by 
Minna Kanerva, Anthony Arundel and René Kemp 
2009-48 Firm Ownership, FOEs, and POEs by Alice H. Amsden 
2009-49 Types of Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth by Erik Stam and André van Stel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
